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Abstract
The recent activity in pension buyouts and bespoke longevity swaps suggests that a significant process
of aggregation of longevity exposures is under way, led by major investment banks and buyout firms
with the support of leading reinsurers. As regulatory capital charges and limited reinsurance capacity
constrain the scope for market growth, there is now an opportunity for institutions that are pooling
longevity exposures to issue securities that appeal to capital market investors, thereby broadening
the sharing of longevity risk and increasing market capacity. For this to happen, longevity exposures
need to be suitably pooled and tranched to maximize diversification benefits offered to investors and
to address asymmetric information issues. We argue that a natural way for longevity risk to be
transferred is through suitably designed principal-at-risk bonds.
1 Introduction
The total amount of pension-related longevity risk exposure in private-sector corporations is globally
estimated at $25 trillion.1 In 2006, a market started in the UK to transfer longevity risk from the
pension plans of UK corporations. From 2010, this market became international, with transfers taking
place in Holland, the US and Canada. However, the total value of the transfers since the market started
has been little more than $100 billion, a small fraction of the total exposure. In addition, most of the
transfers have ended up with insurance and reinsurance companies.2 A small proportion of the total has
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2The market was started by newly established mono-line insurers known as buyout companies. Later, larger traditional
insurance companies and reinsurance companies and investment banks entered the market.
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involved investment banks which have passed the risk exposure on to capital markets investors. This
rate of transfer to the capital markets needs to grow significantly, since there is insufficient capital in the
insurance and reinsurance industry to absorb the total exposure.
Furthermore, long-term capital markets investors need to be persuaded to hold longevity risk exposure
in a form in which they are comfortable and with a suitable longevity risk premium which reflects the
true level of risk they are assuming. Long-term investors, such as sovereign wealth funds, endowments,
family offices, should find a longevity-linked asset an attractive one to hold in a diversified portfolio,
since its return will have low correlation with the returns on other asset classes, such as financial assets,
real estate and commodities. However, such investors are currently wary of longevity-linked assets. If
experts in longevity risk, such as insurance companies, are trying to sell this risk on to them, is this just
because they see this simply as an opportunity to gain some capital relief from their regulator, a perfectly
legitimate business practice? Or is it because they have become aware that the risk is greater than they
initially believed and are trying to oﬄoad it on to unsuspecting investors before the true extent of the
exposure becomes more widely known?
A relevant problem here is asymmetric information. One party to the transaction knows more about
what is being offered for sale than the other party. In the extreme case, the potential buyer in the
transaction might be so suspicious of the potential seller’s intention that they will not transact at any
price: in this case, there will be no market. For a market to exist in the presence of asymmetric
information, the potential seller needs to find a way of communicating to the potential buyer the true
extent of the information that they have acquired about the item up for sale. In other words, they have
to provide an appropriate signal to the potential buyer that they are not being sold a ‘lemon’.3
In this article, we outline how a market in longevity risk transfers may grow out of the recent activity
in pension liability transfers. Figure 1 provides a stylized representation of the potential participants in
such a market. There are some holders of longevity risk exposures, which we may regard as ‘informed’. An
example is a large pension plan which has undertaken a longevity study of its members and beneficiaries,
and therefore has acquired private information about its own longevity exposure. There are then holders
of longevity exposures which (oversimplifying) we may regard as ‘uninformed’. An example is a small
pension plan which does not have the resources to undertake a longevity study of its members. There are
also informed intermediaries, such as insurance companies and investment banks, which have conducted
their own longevity studies of the members of pension plans, but are considering selling on their longevity
risk exposure either directly to investors or to intermediaries in insurance-linked securities. Finally, there
are end investors (and other intermediaries), whom we may regard as ‘uninformed’, in the sense that
they have not conducted any longevity studies of their own, possibly because they do not have access
3A ‘lemon’ is something, such as a second-hand car, which is revealed to be faulty only after it has been purchased.
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to the plan data needed to conduct such a study. They therefore have less information about the true
extent of the longevity risk in which they are being invited to invest than those selling it, a classic case
of asymmetric information.
An effective way of overcoming the problem of asymmetric information for an informed seller is to
disclose information about relevant risk characteristics of the exposures being transferred (e.g., sex, age,
medical status, similar details on potential beneficiaries of any survivor benefits), or to signal their quality
by retaining part of the exposures. Another effective tool is to structure the risk transfer vehicle so as
to minimize the sensitivity of the vehicle’s cashflows to the issuer’s private information. This would
typically entail pooling and tranching the exposure, as we outline below. There is also an important role
for regulators here, as they may provide incentives to disclose and use detailed information from the very
same internal models used to demonstrate the capital resilience of (re)insurers and buyout firms in the
primary market for longevity exposures.
Informed holders
of exposures
Uninformed
investors
Informed
intermediary
Uninformed holders
of exposures
Figure 1: The participants in a market for longevity risk transfers.
2 The optimal level of securitization of longevity exposures
Securitization,4 in general, involves the bundling together of a set of illiquid assets or liabilities (in our
case the latter or both) with a similar set of risk exposures and then the sale of this bundled package to
investors. The purpose of such a bundling exercise is to reduce the idiosyncratic (or diversifiable) risk
which is contained in each of the individual assets or liabilities when they are considered in isolation,
while leaving the systematic (or non-diversifiable) risk to be borne by the investor. In our case, the
idiosyncratic risk relates to the uncertainty surrounding the length of life of individual plan members,
4See Cowley and Cummins (2005), for an overview of insurance securitization.
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while the systematic risk relates to the uncertainty surrounding the average length of life of the members
of the group taken as a whole. We call these two types of risk idiosyncratic and systematic longevity
risk, respectively.
We would not expect investors to be interested in holding idiosyncratic longevity risk, any more than
they would be interested in being exposed to the idiosyncratic risk from holding just a single company’s
share in their investment portfolio. This is why longevity risk needs to be pooled before securitization.
However, investors would be willing to invest in a particular asset class if they are appropriately rewarded
for the true level of systematic longevity risk that they are assuming. So for investors to become interested
in buying into this particular asset class, they need to have confidence that the premium they are being
paid by buyout firms, reinsurers, and pension plans reflects the true level of systematic longevity risk
underlying the transaction.
A natural way for informed sellers to persuade potential investors that this is the case is to retain
some of the exposure themselves. If the seller keeps some ‘skin in the game’, this provides an important
as well as a credible signal to investors, since longevity exposures are very capital intensive - in terms of
both regulatory and economic capital requirements - for the insurance companies operating in longevity
space. Investors will also realize that the larger the securitization fraction (γ) - the proportion of the total
exposure that the seller seeks to oﬄoad - the greater the severity of the longevity risk exposure indicated
by the seller’s own assessment of longevity risk, and the lower the price the investor will offer. Since
investors will try to neutralize the seller’s informational advantage through a downward sloping demand
curve for the longevity exposure transferred, the seller will try to securitize a fraction of exposure that
is optimal, in the sense that it minimizes the cost to the seller from oﬄoading the risk exposure. If the
chosen fraction is too low, an insufficient amount of the longevity risk will be transferred to investors and
the seller will have to bear higher retention costs (in terms of higher capital requirements than desired).
If the fraction is too high, investors will demand too high a risk premium, thus reducing the benefits
of capital relief from securitization. The seller thus faces two costs, retention costs (from the capital
requirements) and liquidity costs (from the downward sloping demand curve), and will wish to minimize
the sum of these costs.5
3 The optimal tranching of longevity exposures
How should the securitized longevity exposure be transferred to investors? The seller of the exposure
wants to sell a liability, while the buyer of the exposure wants to hold an asset. How can the sale of a
liability by an informed holder or intermediary become an asset to an uninformed investor? Further, we
5This situation is formalized in the model of DeMarzo and Duffie (1999) for example.
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can assume that the investor will not want to be responsible for making the pension payments once the
securitization transaction has taken place.
To answer these questions, note that the holders of the longevity exposure are really looking for
a longevity risk hedge for a fraction (γ) of their current holdings. The holders need to persuade the
investors to provide that hedge in exchange for receiving an appropriate longevity risk premium. When
sellers are more informed, a possible way to do this is for the holders of the longevity exposure to issue a
principal-at-risk bond which the investors will buy. The return on the bond will incorporate a longevity
risk premium in addition to the usual credit risk premium associated with the issuer.6 By issuing such
a bond, it is the pure longevity risk that is transferred, not the exposure itself or the obligation to make
the pension payments.7 The securitization of longevity risk is therefore different from other forms of
longevity risk transfers (such as pension buyouts) in which assets and liabilities are bundled up and
transferred in their entirety.
The principal-at-risk bond will repay the principal in full if the proportion of the members from the
population underlying the risk transfer who have survived between the bond’s issue and maturity dates is
below a preset level. However, if the proportion who have survived (i.e., the survival rate) is higher than
this preset level (known as the point of attachment), the amount of principal returned to the investor will
be reduced according to some preset formula. If the survival rate exceeds another preset level (known as
the point of exhaustion), the investor gets no principal back.
The point of attachment will be determined to minimize the sensitivity of the bond’s value to private
information, and hence the cost to the holder of the exposure from issuing the bond.8 Multiple attachment
points can be used to meet the demand of investors with different risk preferences.
In financial engineering terms, the principal-at-risk bond is a combination of a standard bond paying
100 at maturity and a call option which has been sold by the investors to the bond’s issuer (in the case of
a single point of attachment). The option will expire in-the-money if, on the bond’s maturity date, the
survival rate from the reference population (S) exceeds the preset level (S∗). The principal repayment
to investors will be reduced in this case. The point of attachment is therefore the same as the strike price
of the option. The option will expire worthless if S is below S∗. We can therefore write the formula for
the repayment of principal as B = 100 − max(0, S − S∗), where max(0, S − S∗) means the larger of 0
and (S − S∗) and is the formula for the value of a call option on its expiry date.
The seller of the bond therefore has an effective hedge against systematic longevity risk for survival
6The bond would typically be collateralized and issued via a Special Purpose Vehicle, a procedure that would influence
the size of the credit risk premium.
7Should the holder of the exposure wish to do so, this responsibility could be transferred to a third party administrator
who would make the pension payments.
8It is a central tenet of corporate finance theory that debt-like instruments can minimize the adverse effects of information
asymmetry when raising capital through issuance of securities (e.g., Tirole, 2005)
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rates S which lie above S∗, but bears all the longevity risk below S∗. Another way to think of this is
that we have tranched the exposure at S∗ with the current holder of the exposure bearing the longevity
risk below S∗ and investors bearing the longevity risk above S∗. The optimal tranching level will be the
one that minimizes the cost to the holder of transferring the exposure, as shown in Figure 2. If S∗ is set
too low, the longevity risk premium demanded by investors will be excessive and the price that they will
agree to pay for the bond will be too low. If S∗ is set too high, the holder of the exposure bears too much
of the longevity risk. A rough measure of the ex-post cost of the hedge is B − P , the difference between
the principal actually repaid and the initial sale price of the bond. The bond issuer’s objective is to
choose the optimal tranching level (or, equivalently, the strike price or point of attachment) to minimize
the cost of the longevity hedge to the issuer.
A key issue to address is the choice of reference population that determines the payments on the bond.
So far, we have assumed that the bond issuer would prefer it if the reference population were the same
as its own population of pension plan members. This would allow the bond issuer to establish a very
effective hedge against its own exposure. But in a world of asymmetric information, investors who buy
the bond might not feel comfortable about this, since the bond issuer will be determining the principal
repayment in a manner which might be perceived to lack full transparency. Investors, however, might be
more comfortable if the reference population were the same as the national population (or other publicly
monitored population) since, in this case, information on survival and mortality rates are published by
the country’s independent official statistical agency. By doing this, asymmetric information issues are less
of a concern, but a new problem emerges: using a national population index to hedge the longevity risk of
a sub-group of the population introduces basis risk in the hedge. Basis risk arises because the mortality
experience of the national population might differ from the sub-group being hedged. In particular, we
know that members of pension plans tend to live longer than members of the population as a whole,
so the national index might involve underestimating the longevity risk of the pensioner sub-group being
hedged. While basis risk certainly exists, studies have shown that it can also be hedged quite effectively
and so hedges and principal-at-risk bonds based on national indices can provide very good, if not 100%,
hedge effectiveness (see, e.g., Coughlan et al (2011)). Hedge effectiveness can be further increased if
exposures are pooled or aggregated.
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Figure 2: The optimal tranching level S∗.
4 Pooling or aggregating exposures
If multiple small exposures, such as those associated with a number of small pension plans, are pooled
or aggregated together,9 there might be further diversification benefits,10 although any informational
advantage concerning the individual longevity trends within the separate exposures will be destroyed.11
A principal-at-risk bond with n diversifiable exposures will have the following repayment value:
B = 100 − max(0, Sn − S
∗
n
), where S∗
n
is the optimal tranching level (or, equivalently, strike price or
point of attachment) and Sn is the average exposure when there are a total of n exposures. Figure 3
shows the diversification benefits from pooling: the expected cost to the issuer of the bond and the strike
price are both lower compared with the case where the exposures are tranched separately.
Pooling and tranching are more valuable when the private information on the severity of longevity
risk affects the entire pool rather than being specific to each individual exposure. This would be the
case when the survival rates relate to different cohorts of pension plan members, but the underlying
characteristics are similar, for example, they come from the same geographical area, social class, gender
or age grouping (e.g., men in their 70s). Pooling on the basis of such factors can reduce the costs
associated with asymmetric information. Further, the benefits from pooling therefore increase with the
9Buyout and other insurance and reinsurance companies have already been acting as aggregators and may find themselves
as naturally positioned to take on this intermediary role.
10See Subrahmanyam (1991); Gorton and Pennacchi (1993) for example.
11See DeMarzo (2005), for example.
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Figure 3: Tranching with and without pooling.
size of the pool.
5 Conclusions
We argue that a natural format for transferring longevity risk to end investors is a principal-at-risk bond.
The bond’s payments need to be structured in a way that deals with the concerns that investors will have
about the seller of the bond having more information about the true level of longevity risk underlying the
exposure than the investor has. This problem of asymmetric information can be managed by suitably
pooling and securitizing the exposures in tranches. To give comfort to the investor that they are not
being sold a ‘lemon’, the longevity risk hedger needs to keep some ‘skin in the game’, by retaining some
of the exposure. To minimize the cost of the hedge, the hedger should only hedge the extreme longevity
risk, that is, the longevity risk above a threshold level which we have called the optimal tranching level
(or, equivalently, strike price or point of attachment). To further reduce the cost to the hedger, they
should pool or aggregate their longevity exposures as much as possible. This reduces the information
advantage of the seller about individual longevity trends, but it increases the degree of diversification
and, in turn, might reduce the basis risk faced by hedger.
Figure 4 shows the risk transfers that might characterize the stylized longevity risk market discussed
in this note. Uninformed holders of longevity risk exposures, such as small pension plans, should pool
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and transfer their full exposures to informed intermediaries, since transferring exposures separately
would expose them to ’cherry picking’ from more informed counterparties.12 Informed holders, such
as large pension plans, will retain the fraction (1 − γ∗
1
) of their exposure and securitize the fraction γ∗
1
by transferring it to (less) informed intermediaries. They could also deal directly with end investors
by retaining a larger fraction (1 − γ∗
2
) of their exposure and securitizing a smaller fraction γ∗
2
, possibly
tranching it at an optimal level S∗. Finally, informed intermediaries would deal with end investors by
pooling their exposures (say n) and tranching them at level S∗
n
.13
The issuance of instruments linked to public longevity indices would side step asymmetric information
issues but expose hedgers to basis risk. Even in this case, however, the principal-at-risk format would
appear a natural solution, given the familiarity of investors in insurance-linked securities with catastrophe
bonds with payoffs linked to indices or parametric triggers. It so happens that the principal-at-risk
format was precisely the format chosen by Swiss Re when it issued its Vita bonds14 to hedge the extreme
mortality risk it was hedging. So we have a very successful precedent in the form of mortality bonds
which should help promote an equally successful capital market in longevity risk transfers.
Informed holders
of exposures
retain 1− γ∗
2
,
transfer γ∗
2
retain 1− γ∗
1
,
transfer γ∗
1
Uninformed
investors
pool n exposures,
tranche at S∗
n
Informed
intermediary
pool and
transfer
Uninformed holders
of exposures
Figure 4: The market for longevity risk transfers.
12We note that figures 1 and 4 encompass both cases of informed and uninformed sellers of longevity exposures. In the
first case, the investors face the ‘buyer’s curse’ (the risk of ending up with a ‘lemon’) when buying from more informed
counterparties. In the second case, the uninformed holders of exposures face the ‘seller’s curse’ (of being exposed to ‘cherry
picking’) when selling to more informed counterparties.
13For a more formal analysis together with proofs of the propositions discussed in this paper, see Biffis and Blake (2010,
2012).
14See “Swiss Re transfers $180 million of extreme mortality risk” (accessed 1 July 2012).
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